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Abstract
The objective of this study is to estimate the degree of oligopsony power
in the U.S. cattle industry with the use of the recently developed stochastic
frontier estimator of market power. Unlike the seminal paper where estima-
tion of the mark-up in an output market at firm level was the main objective,
this work proposes a stochastic production frontier estimator in order to es-
timate the mark-down in an input market at aggregate level. Furthermore,
with the help of the new estimator we derive and estimate the Lerner index
of oligospony power for the U.S. cattle market. For the empirical part of the
study we employed annual time series data from the U.S. cattle/beef indus-
try for the time period 1970-2009. Our results suggest that beef packers exert
market power when purchasing live cattle for slaughter.
Keywords: cattle; stochastic frontier analysis; oligopsony; market power
JEL classification: Q11, C13, L66.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. agricultural sector has been revolutionized by a process called agricul-
tural industrialization. This process refers to the production, coordination, and
distribution of food products using modern methods typically associated with
industrial manufacturing. In the beef sector, the benefits of industrialization in-
clude higher productivity and the availability of leaner and higher quality beef
products.
Despite these benefits, some aspects of industrialization raise questions about
the performance of the beef marketing system. One particular aspect is rising con-
centration in the beef-packing industry and its effect on live cattle prices. Since
the 1980s, the U.S. fed–cattle industry has experienced shifts of production to
larger farms. At the same time, the beef-packing industry has become much more
concentrated than cattle feeding (?). Data from the ? show that both the number
and the size distribution of beef-packing plants has changed dramatically in the
recent years. Between 1980 and 2012 the number of plants decreased from 704 to
168 and the share of the top four firm in steer and heifer slaughter increased from
35.7% to 85%. During the years, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) reached
the level of 85 percent in 2010, dropped to 84 percent in 2011, and raised again
to 85 percent in 2012. According to the same report, the four-firm concentration
ratio has remained around 80% in the last ten years. In theory, the higher the CR4,
meaning the closer it approaches 100%, the greater the likelihood the four largest
firms are exercising market power.
Whether such high levels of concentration are detrimental to competition in
live cattle markets has been the subject of many studies using different economic
models, time spans, and statistical techniques. More importantly, as more slaugh-
ter cattle is now procured through contracts, otherwise know as captive supplies,
there is also concern that packers may also “manipulate” cash prices to influence
the base price used to negotiate contracts.
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Higher levels of concentration generally lead to lower prices paid for fed cat-
tle indicating that the beef-packing industry exerts some degree of market power
when procuring live cattle (????). That degree of oligopsonistic power, accord-
ing to some studies, is not large enough to warrant concern (??). In most of
these studies, the magnitude of market power is relatively small and seemingly
within an “acceptable” public policy level (?). On the other hand, since beef-
packing is a high-volume/low-margin business (?), some researchers argue that
given the large volume of cattle slaughtered every year, even a small degree of
market power can translate into large transfers from the cattle producers to beef-
packers. Hence, a seemingly small impact in dollars per hundredweight ($/cwt)
can make a substantial difference (losses) to livestock producers (?). Yet some
authors report that losses to cattle producers are more than offset by the cost sav-
ings generated by increased concentration in the beef-packing industry, suggest-
ing this way that structural changes are beneficial from an efficiency viewpoint
(??). Lastly, some studies find no evidence of market power exercised by the beef
packers during the time period considered in their study (??).
Granted that there is merit to each of the preceding arguments, all of them
hang to a large degree on the academic research that guides them. The most in-
fluential research in the past few years has been what is commonly known as the
New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO). In a nutshell, NEIO is an econo-
metric approach that treats market power as a parameter to be inferred from sin-
gle industries data (?).
Against this background, the objective of the present work is to revisit the
econometric problem of estimating the degree of oligopsony power in the U.S.
cattle industry with the use of the recently developed stochastic frontier (SFA)
estimation technique by Khumbhakar, Baardsen and Lien (2012). In their article,
? propose a new method of estimating market power in an output market at firm
level. They draw on the stochastic frontier methodology from the efficiency lit-
4
erature in order to estimate markups in the Norwegian sawmilling industry. The
authors use both primal and dual specifications to represent the technology and
consequently estimate the degree of oligopoly power. Both approaches reveal
statistically significant evidence of market power. The primal and dual specifica-
tions of the technology is a big advantage of the stochastic frontier approach of
market power estimation: in an output market, based on duality theory of cost
and input distance functions, either input price data or quantity price data can be
used. On the other hand, duality of revenue functions and output distance func-
tions can be utilized for the case of the input market. Furthermore, the stochastic
frontier estimation technique allows us to estimate market power under constant
or variable returns to scale, which is not always the case in the NEIO approach,
providing us with more flexibility in the measurement of mark-ups/downs of an
industry.
In the most recent paper, ? used the stochastic frontier estimator in order to
test if the Grammen Bank exercises market power over borrowers. The authors
employed a stochastic translog cost function. More specifically, the authors used
annual time series for the 1985-2012 period in order to test whether the Grameen
Bank’s lending rates are consistent with marginal cost pricing. Their results indi-
cated that on average the lending rate is about 3% above marginal cost.
This study proposes a stochastic production frontier estimator in order to es-
timate the mark-down in an input market at industry level. The input market
under investigation is the U.S. cattle industry. To the best of our knowledge, there
has been no published work which has used the stochastic frontier approach in
order to estimate the degree of oligopsony power exercised by the U.S. beef–
packing industry when procuring live cattle.
The present work is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the theoretical
framework. Section 3 presents the empirical model to be estimated at aggregate
level and Section 4 the data and estimation results. Section 5 provides a summary
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and conclusion.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Beef packing firm
The starting point of this work is the profit maximizing beef packing firm. The
profits for a beef processor (i) are given by:
Πi = Ri(P, xi, zi)−Wx(X) xi −Wz zi
= P qi(xi, zi)−Wx(X) xi −Wz zi
= P f (xi, zi)−Wx(X) xi −Wz zi (1)
where xi is the cattle input and zi the rest of the inputs employed by firm i in
order to produce beef (qi). Beef is a homogeneous good sold at price P. In this
study, we assume that the packer has no degree of market power when selling
the beef output. On the other hand, the packer has some degree of oligopsonistic
power when purchasing live cattle. The price of cattle is Wx, where Wx = Wx(X).
The rest of the inputs employed by the processor in the production of beef are
competitively priced (Wz).
Profit maximization with respect to the livestock input means that:
dΠi
dxi
= 0 (2)
Using equation 1 we get:
dΠi
dxi
=
d(P f (xi, zi))
dxi
−Wx − dWx(X)dX
dX
dxi
xi = 0
P d f (xi, zi)
dxi
−Wx = dWx(X)dX
dX
dxi
xi (3)
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The expression dXdxi captures the increase in total cattle supply induced by an
increase in processor i’s demand for cattle. After rearrangement of equation 3 we
get:
P
d f (xi, zi)
dxi
= Wx (1+
φi
e
)
P × MPxi = Wx (1+
φi
e
)
MVPxi = Wx (1+
φi
e
) (4)
where e is the elasticity of cattle supply and is positive, and φi = dXdxi
xi
X is the
conjectural variation elasticity parameter. The values of the parameter φi range
from zero to one. This means that from equation 4 we get the following inequal-
ity:
Wx < MVPxi
Wx < P× MPxi (5)
If we multiply both sides of the above equation by ( 1P
xi
qi
) we get:
1
P
xi
qi
Wx <
1
P
xi
qi
P
dqi
dxi
xi Wx
P qi
<
d ln qi
d ln xi
(6)
We can transform the inequality in equation 6 to an equality by adding a non–
negative, one–sided term ui:
xi Wx
P qi
+ ui =
d ln qi
d ln xi
, ui > 0
or
xi Wx
P qi
=
d ln qi
d ln xi
− ui (7)
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2.2 Translog representation of a stochastic frontier production
function for the beef packing firm
? used a translog production function in order to estimate the indices of market
power in the U.S. red meat industry. As the authors point out, a translog pro-
duction function does not impose severe a priori constraints on the production
characteristics in the industry. By employing a translog production function the
authors dispense with the necessity of assuming fixed proportions for the input
of interest. There is well documented research that food processing industries are
characterized by input substitutability. ? found evidence of substantial substitu-
tion possibilities between farm inputs and marketings inputs for beef and veal.
In addition, ? concluded that technological changes in the food industries have
allowed for greater input substitutability. In the light of the preceding we employ
a variable proportions technology in order to represent the production process in
the beef packing sector. More specifically, for a beef processor i, the production
process is captured by the following translog production function:
ln qi = β0 + βt t +
1
2
βtt t2 + βxt ln xi t + βKt ln Ki t + βLt ln Li t
+βEt ln Ei t + βx ln xi + βK ln Ki + βL ln Li + βE ln Ei
+
1
2
βxx (ln xi)2 +
1
2
βKK (ln Ki)2 +
1
2
βLL (ln Li)2
+
1
2
βEE (ln Ei)2 +
1
2
lnxi (βxK ln Ki + βxL ln Li + βxE ln Ei)
+
1
2
ln Ki (βKx ln xi + βKL ln Li + βKE ln Ei)
+
1
2
ln Li (βLx ln xi + βLK ln Ki + βLE ln Ei)
+
1
2
ln Ei (βEx ln xi + βEK ln Ki + βEL ln Li) (8)
where xi=cattle input, Li=labor, Ki=capital, and Ei=energy are employed by
processor i in order to produce qi=beef output. The time index t is included to
account for technological progress. The above function is assumed to satisfy the
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following restrictions: βxL = βLx, βxE = βEx, βxK = βKx, βLK = βKL, βLE = βEL,
and βKE = βEK.
From equation 8, the expression for d ln qid ln xi becomes:
d ln qi
d ln xi
= βx + βxt t + βxx ln xi + βxL ln Li + βxK ln Ki + βxE ln Ei (9)
Substituting equation 9 into equation 7 we get the stochastic version of the
profit maximizing relationship for the beef packing firm:
Wx xi
P qi
= βx + βxt t + βxx ln xi + βxL ln Li + βxK ln Ki + βxE ln Ei − ui + ei (10)
The composed error term (−ui + ei) in equation 10 is no different than the
one from a stochastic production frontier model.1 Hence, equation 10 can be
estimated using the maximum likelihood method which is commonly used to
estimate a stochastic production frontier. The maximum likelihood method is
based on the distributional assumption of the errors. Following the literature, the
distributional assumptions are that ui is a normal variable truncated at zero from
below, i.e. ui ∼ N+(0, σ2ui), and ei is the usual two-sided normal noise term, i.e. ei
∼ N(0, σ2ei). In this work, unlike the stochastic frontier analysis approach, the one-
sided term ui in equation 10 does not account for the inefficiency in production,
but for the mark-down in the cattle market for a beef packing firm.
2.3 A stochastic production frontier estimator of oligopsony power
for the beef packing firm
In this work we define the degree of market power exerted by the ith beef packing
firm as:
θi =
MVPxi −Wx
MVPxi
(11)
1For a translog representation of a stochastic production frontier one can refer to ?, ?, ?.
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Re-arranging equation 11 we get:
θi =
MVPxi −Wx
P× MPxi
=
MVPxi −Wx
P (dqidxi )
=
MVPxi −Wx
( qixi ) P (
dqi
dxi
)( xiqi )
=
( xiP qi )(MVPxi −Wx)
(d ln qid ln xi )
=
( xiP qi )[P (
dqi
dxi
)]− ( xiP qi )Wx
(d ln qid ln xi )
=
(d ln qid ln xi )− (
xi Wx
Ri
)
(d ln qid ln xi )
=
(d ln qid ln xi )− (
d ln qi
d ln xi
− ui)
(d ln qid ln xi )
=
ui
(d ln qid ln xi )
Hence, the relationship between the degree of market power θi and the mark
down term ui is given by the equation below:
θi =
ui
(d ln qid ln xi )
(12)
After estimating ui from equation 10 and with the help of the expression in
equation 9, we can proceed with the estimation of θi as:
θˆi =
uˆi
(βˆx + βˆxt t + βˆxx ln xi + βˆxL ln Li + βˆxK ln Ki + βˆxE ln Ei)
(13)
The mark-down parameter θi of equation 11 can be expanded as:
θi =
MVPxi −Wx
MVPxi
=
(
MVPxi
MVPxi
)− ( WxMVPxi )
(
MVPxi
MVPx )
= 1− Wx
MVPxi
Solving the above equation we get:
(1− θi) = WxMVPxi
(14)
Equation 14 will be used in order to derive the relationship between the Lerner
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index of market power and the degree of market power θi for the case of a single
beef processor i:
Li =
MVPxi −Wx
Wx
=
(
MVPxi
MVPxi
)− ( WxMVPxi )
( WxMVPxi
)
=
1− (1− θi)
(1− θi) =
θi
1− θi
Hence, after estimating θi with the help of equation 13, the Lerner index of oligop-
sony power for the beef packer i can be estimated as:
Lˆi =
θˆi
1− θˆi
(15)
3 Aggregation and empirical model
The absence of panel data on firm-level suggests that we can neither estimate
the mark down term ui nor the degree of market power θi. As a consequence,
we cannot proceed with the estimation of the Lerner index of oligopsony power
exercised by the U.S. beef packing firms when purchasing live cattle. This limita-
tion leads us to consider the problem at aggregate level. In order to achieve this
we make the assumption that in equilibrium the conjectural variation elasticities
do not vary across firms (?). This means that φi=Φ for every beef-packer in the
industry. As ? point out, maintaining the invariance of the conjectural variation
across firms enables us to drop the subscript i on the marginal products and con-
sider the result as a weighted industry marginal product, where the weights are
each firm’s share in the cattle market.
More specifically, multiplying through equation 3 by xiX and summing across
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the N firms of the industry we obtain the aggregate supply relation:
N
∑
i=1
xi
X
P MPxi =
N
∑
i=1
xi
X
Wx +
N
∑
i=1
xi
X
Wx
Φ
e
(16)
move the constant terms out of the summations:
P
N
∑
i=1
xi
X
MPxi = Wx
N
∑
i=1
xi
X
+Wx
Φ
e
N
∑
i=1
xi
X
(17)
and since ∑Ni=1
xi
X = 1, we get:
P × MPx = Wx +Wx Φ
e
(18)
where MPx = ∑Ni=1
xi
X MPxi is the weighted industry marginal product (?).
Hence, the industry analogue of equation 4 is:
MVPx = Wx (1+
Φ
e
), (19)
where Φe represents the industry-wide index of market power in the livestock
market. Since e and Φ are positive, the equality of equation 19 can be written in
the form of an inequality as:
Wx < MVPx (20)
The inequality in equation 20 has the same direction as the inequality in equa-
tion 5. Multiplying through by ( 1P
X
Q ), adding a positive term u in order to trans-
form the above inequality to an equality and following the same procedure de-
scribed in section 2, but at market level, we arrive at the following relationship:
WX X
P Q
= BX + BXt t + BXX ln X + BXL ln L + BXK ln K + BXE ln E− u + e (21)
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The main difference between equation 10 and equation 21 is that the former
is at firm level while the latter is at industry level. Estimation of equation 21 will
provide us with estimates of the term u at market level. After estimating u, we
can estimate the degree of market power θ for the industry as:
θˆ =
uˆ
(BˆX + BˆXt t + BˆXX ln X + BˆXL ln L + BˆXK ln K + BˆXE ln E)
(22)
It is clear from equation 22 that the estimate of the parameter θ depends on
the estimated values of u as well as on the relevant parameters of the translog
production function.
Finally, the Lerner index of market power exercised by the U.S. beef-packing
industry when procuring live cattle will be estimated as:
Lˆ =
θˆ
1− θˆ (23)
4 Data and estimation results
The data used for the empirical analysis are annual aggregate time series for
the U.S. beef– packing and cattle industies. Data were obtained from the ? for
SIC2011 (meatpacking) and from the ??. Observations refer to the period 1970–
2009. The sample period was dictated by data availability. The year 2009 is the
most recent year for which data from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) are reported. A detailed description of the data and their sources can be
found in the Appendix.
Inputs at the processing stage are divided into three categories: labor (L), cap-
ital (K) and energy (E). Data for these three factors of production are available for
the U.S. red meat industry as a whole (NBER–SIC 2011).2 In order to quantita-
tively account for the levels of labor, capital and energy employed specifically for
2Red meat includes beef, pork, lamb and veal.
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the production of beef, we multiply the aggregate levels of the above mentioned
factors of production with the percentage of the beef product in relationship with
the rest of the meat products.
Capital is taken into account as a quasi-fixed input. The annual user cost of
capital was calculated as the sum of the real interest rate and the depreciation
rate.3 Energy was deflated in order to obtain an approximation to the physical
quantity used in this study. Time accounts for technological change and assumes
the values between one (for the observation year of 1970) and forty (for the last
observation year of 2009). Table 1 provides the definition of variables used in
estimating equation 21 and presents their respective descriptive statistics.
The estimates of the parameters of the translog production function employed
in estimating equation 21 are presented in Table 2.4 All estimates are statistically
significant at the 1% level of significance or less with the exception of the time
parameter.
Table 3 presents estimates and (bootstrap) standard errors of the relevant pa-
rameters of the model: the mark-down term u, the degree of market power θ
as expressed in equation 22, and the Lerner index of oligopsony power (L) as
measured in equation 23. All estimates are statistically different than zero. The
estimated value of the mark-down parameter u is 0.9680. The estimate of the de-
gree of market power θ of 0.1862, suggesting that, on average, the price received
by the cattle producers is 18.62% lower than the net value of the marginal product
of cattle. Lastly, the estimate of the Lerner index of market power takes the value
of 0.2289, indicating that, on average, the cattle’s net marginal value product is
1.229 times above the price of cattle.
Qualitatively, our results are comparable to studies that have concluded that
U.S. beef-packers exert market power when purchasing finished cattle for slaugh-
3Assuming a 20-year equipment working life in the food processing industry and a linear
form, a value of 0.05 was applied to the depreciation rate (?).
4Due to non-convergence, the labor parameter has been omitted.
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ter. More specifically, ? finds evidence of oligopsonistic distortions in the fed
cattle market. ? conclude that market power is exerted by U.S. beef packers
in the cattle as well as in the beef output markets. ? find evidence of oligop-
sonistic power in regional fed cattle markets. In the same year, ? and ? suggest
that oligopsonistic power is exercised in the livestock market by the beef–packing
industry at national level for the time periods 1972-1986 and 1978-1987, respec-
tively. ? constructs an empirical bilateral oligopoly model and results reveal ev-
idence of market power in the beef slaughter industry. In the following year, ?
and ? conclude that beef packers exert oligopsonistic power when procuring live
cattle, at national and regional levels, respectively. ? suggests that the empirical
relationship between captive supplies and the price of cattle paid to producers is
negative, a result that might be attributed to the presence of oligopsonistic con-
duct in the livestock sector. After 2000, there are also quite a few studies that
confirm the presence of oligopsonistic power in the U.S. cattle industry. ? find
evidence of olipsonistic power exerted by beef–packing firms while accounting
for inventory dynamics into a standard conjectural variations model of market
power. ? finds evidence of oligopsonistic power in the short-run as well as in the
long-run in the U.S. cattle market. Empirical results are statistically significant
but not big enough to warrant any concern. ? conclude that oligopsonistic power
is exerted in three regional fed-cattle markets in the central United States as well
as the whole U.S. market. ? conclude that the U.S. cattle industry is characterized
by imperfectly competitive conduct in the procurement of cattle, before and after
the 2003-2006 ban on imports and exports of cattle and beef, respectively. In a re-
cent study, Cai, Stiegert and Koontz (2011) find evidence of oligopsonistic power
being exercised in fed cattle markets before and after the implementation of the
Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act in 2001.
In the aforementioned studies, distortions in cattle prices due to oligopsonistic
power exercised in the cattle market were as low as 1% (Schroeter1988). On the
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other hand, Azzam and Schroeter (1990) estimate that 55% of the farm–to–retail
price spread in the beef market can be attributed to market power with oligop-
sonistic and oligopolistic power having almost an equal contribution.
The empirical results of this work suggest that fed cattle were priced 18.62%
lower than their net marginal value product, indicating evidence of non–competitive
behavior in the U.S. cattle industry. Spatial characteristics of the cattle market can
be employed to provide a possible explanation for the findings of this article. Live
cattle can be transported only a limited distance to slaughter. Shipping live ani-
mals long distances is quite costly and can cause high levels of mortality. Hence,
cattle producers to a particular location may face few buyers who might exert
market power when purchasing cattle for slaughter. The statistical significant
findings of this study support the above statement. Furthermore, the value of the
mark-down parameter u is positive for each observation in the sample, strength-
ening this way our argument for the potential presence of non-competitive be-
havior in the U.S. cattle industry over the period examined in this work.
5 Summary and conclusion
The objective of this paper was to measure the degree of oligopsony power in
the U.S. cattle industry with the use of the recently developed stochastic frontier
estimator of market power. In this work, unlike the seminal paper that measures
the mark-up in an output market at firm level, we develop a stochastic production
frontier estimator in order to estimate the mark-down in an input (cattle) market
at industry level.
The starting point of this work is the profit maximizing beef-packing firm.
Optimizing and using elements from the SFA literature we derive a stochastic
production frontier estimator of market power for the individual beef packer.
Unfortunately, firm specific data are rarely available. We resolve this difficulty
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by providing a method in order to produce market power estimates at aggregate
level.
Our empirical results indicate that the U.S. beef–packing industry exercises
market power when procuring live cattle. The value of the mark-down term u is
positive and statistically significant. The estimated value of the Lerner index of
oligopsonistic power is 0.2289 and is statistically different than zero. The specific
finding suggests that, on average, the net value of the marginal product of cattle
is 22.9% higher than the price of cattle. Hence, based on the empirical outcome of
this study, one can conclude that there is significant evidence that cattle feeders
receive lower prices due to the fact that the U.S. market for live cattle might be
imperfectly competitive.
The outcome of this study should be interpreted in light of data limitations
and model construction. A more appropriate data set would contain informa-
tion on the exact number of inputs employed only for beef production. Unfor-
tunately, annual data from the Census are available only for aggregate red meat
output. Furthermore, the choice of the form of the production function can affect
the empirical results of the model.
Finally, the relevant unit of observation in an oligopsonistic model for the U.S.
beef industry is the beef packing firm. Until data on firm level become available,
aggregation is the only avenue in order to estimate the degree of market power
exercised by beef packers when procuring live cattle. As ? point out, little can be
known about how the presence or absence of market power is obscured by too
much or too little aggregation.
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Appendix A
Description of the variables and their sources are as follows:
Source: NBER– CES Manufacturing Industry Database / SIC2011 (meatpacking)
L = Production worker hours for SIC2011 (million hrs)
K =
Real capital stock for SIC2011 (million $)
Cost of capital = interest rate + depreciation rate
E =
Cost of electricity and fuels for SIC2011 (million $)
Deflator for the energy input in SIC2011 (1987=1.00)
Source: United States Department of Agriculture – Economic Research Service
X = Commercial cattle slaughter (1,000 heads) times dressed weight (pounds/head)
W = Beef net farm value (cents per retail pound equivalent)
Q = Commercial beef production (carcass weight, million pounds)
P = Beef wholesale value (cents per retail pound equivalent)
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Tables
Table 1: Variable definition and descriptive statistics (equation 21)
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Min Max
wX Cost of livestock input (billion $) 34.1 9.7 14 52.8
PQ Wholesale value of beef (billion $) 39.8 11.7 16.5 62.4
X Cattle (billion lbs) 24.3 1.7 21.3 27.3
L Production workers(million hrs) 245.8 27.8 197.6 299.8
K Real capital stock(million physical units) 4244.7 337.6 3452.9 4962.2
E Electricity and fuels(million Kws+gallons) 185.9 46 129.4 301.9
t Time trend (1=1970, 40=2009) 20.5 11.7 1 40
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Table 2: Parameter estimates (equation 21)
Parameter Est. value Std. error
BˆX 11.4316 2.2667*
BˆXt 0.0001 0.0005
BˆXX -0.4841 0.1084*
BˆXK 0.2702 0.0733*
BˆXE -0.1247 0.0196*
(*): 1% or less level of significance.
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Table 3: Estimates of mark-down, degree of market power and Lerner index
Parameter Est. value Std.error 95% Confidence Interval
Mark-down, uˆ 0.9680 0.0004 (0.9672, 0.9688)
Degree of market power, θˆ 0.1862 0.0026 (0.1810, 0.1914)
Lerner index, Lˆ 0.2289 0.0049 (0.2191, 0.2387)
Note: Standard errors have been estimated with bootstrap.
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